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Background: Psychological torture is 
deployed to break and obliterate human 
resistance, spirit and personality, but it 
is rarely afforded sufficient attention. 
Deficiencies in conceptualising, documenting 
and adjudicating non-physical torture 
mean that it is frequently left undetected 
and uncontested by the public, media 
and the courts, bolstering impunity for 
its perpetrators. A review of the current 
literature to map conceptual and evidentiary 
shortcomings from an inter-disciplinary 
perspective is therefore warranted. Method: 
The relevant texts were identified through 
a systematic full-text search of databases, 
namely HeinOnline, HUDOC, UNODS and 
DIGNITY´s Documentation Centre, with 
the keywords `psychological torture´, `mental 
pain and suffering´, `severity´, `humiliation´, 
`interrogation techniques´, and `torture 
methods´. The identified texts, limited to 
English-language journal articles, NGO 
reports, court-cases and UN documents 
from 1950 to date, were then selected 
for relevance pertaining to conceptual, 
evidentiary, technological and ethical critique 
provided therein. Results/Discussion: 
Evidential invisibility, subjectivity of the 
suffering, and perceived technological 
control are the primary ways in which 
psychological torture methods are designed, 
and how they manage to evade prosecution 
and consequently be perpetuated.
Cognisant of the need for further research, 
pertinent questions highlighting the need 
to develop approaches, sharpen standards 
and use a medical/psychological/legal 
interdisciplinary approach are suggested. 
Definitions and Concepts
Whilst it is important to view torture in its 
totality and to not disproportionately focus 
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•• Psychological torture is complex and 
lacks appropriate acknowledgement 
in evidence-based fora.
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on certain methods to the exclusion of others 
(see Ginbar, 2017, p. 305), there exists 
clear definitional and conceptual challenges 
with respect to otherwise headline-grabbing 
examples of psychological torture, e.g. 
‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. 
This section will broadly outline the main 
conceptual approaches that have been or 
may be used to define and conceptualise 
psychological torture. 
Methods of torture and the mind and body 
dichotomy
Difficulties in adequately defining 
torture are magnified when it comes to 
psychological torture. As the physical and 
psychological may be viewed as two sides 
of the same coin, conceptually delineating 
between the two poses a difficulty in itself, 
as we straddle the mind/body dichotomy. 
According to Sveaass, the psychological 
impact of powerlessness, fear and 
uncertainty for any victim of torture means 
that ‘there is no such thing as physical 
torture “by itself”’ (2008, pp. 313-314). In 
other words, physical methods of torture 
also have strong psychological effects on a 
victim, and vice-versa. Rape is an oft-cited 
example here as, although often involving a 
physical act, its objective is a psychological 
one to ‘punish, intimidate and humiliate’ 
(see Raquel Martí de Mejía v. Perú, 1996). 
Providing an additional distinction, Pérez-
Sales differentiates between two categories 
within psychological torture, namely 
between pure psychological techniques (e.g. 
humiliation, threats) and attacks on the 
self through attacks on bodily functions (e.g. 
exhaustion, sleep deprivation) (Pérez-
Sales, 2017, p. 9). For present purposes, 
psychological effects of torture (e.g. anxiety, 
depression, PTSD) will be distinguished 
from psychological methods (both targeted 
at the body, e.g. exhaustion, and ‘pure,’ e.g. 
threats), with the latter being the focus of 
this review.
Terminology used to describe, 
dismissively or otherwise, the mental 
suffering as produced by such methods 
reflect these intersections. Some notions, 
such as ‘evidence-free torture’, emphasise the 
invisibility of the torture whether inflicted 
through physical means or not. Terms used 
in the literature include but are not limited 
to: ‘non-physical torture’; ‘white torture’; 
‘invisible torture’; ‘no-touch torture’; ‘clean 
torture’; ‘evidence-free torture’; ‘hands-off 
torture’; ‘mental torture’; ‘torture-lite’, and 
‘psychological torture’. 
Sveaass points out that ‘it may be 
possible to describe extremely painful 
situations where no direct or obvious 
physical pain is inflicted’ (2008, p. 315). For 
these situations, the label of ‘psychological 
torture’ remains apt given that ‘the 
brutality of psychological torture is very 
much based on what we know of human 
psychological function [‘personal agency, 
values, emotions, hope, relationships, and 
trust’], on information and knowledge 
developed within the realm of psychology’ 
(Sveaass, 2008, p. 316). As the methods with 
which this review concerns itself target an 
individual’s psychological integrity based 
on psychological or pseudo-psychological 
concepts, the term ‘psychological torture’ 
will be used throughout this review. 
Notwithstanding this, the pedagogical nature 
of this choice must be borne in mind.
Definitional elements
While international and regional human 
rights frameworks recognise that the use of 
psychological methods in and of themselves 
can constitute torture (as one need only 
refer to the inclusion of ‘mental pain or 
suffering’ under Article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture (UNCAT)), there is a need 
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to produce more workable understandings. 
It is notable to find that its drafters did 
not discuss at any length the meaning of 
‘mental pain or suffering’ but some agreed 
on the difficulties therein (Nowak & 
McArthur, 2008, p. 38). Nowak points to 
the travaux preparatoires in arguing against 
any notion that the ‘drafters intended a 
narrow interpretation that would exclude 
conduct as intentional deprivation of food, 
water, and medical treatment from the 
definition of torture’ (2006, p. 819). While 
strict categorisations of forms of torture 
are avoided, it is clear in most jurisdictions 
that some psychological forms have been 
accepted as constituting torture or inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment.
Beyond a handful of cases, there 
remains a superficiality to judicial reasoning 
which warrants further dialogue with 
non-legal understandings here. Surveying 
relevant jurisprudence, Crampton proposes 
the following criteria as being useful, but 
not definitive, indicators of psychological 
torture: i. actions that prevent the detainee 
from maintaining stable mental health 
(i.e. forced absorption); ii. significance of 
the psychological maltreatment; iii. design 
and planning of the torture; and, iv. the 
perpetrator’s focus on affective bonds 
to pressure the victim (2013). Similarly, 
another set of criteria entails: ‘i. the 
relationship pattern between torture and 
tortured; ii. circumstances of the torturing 
system (political persecution, ethnic 
cleansing, law enforcement procedure); 
iii. Whether techniques target identity; iv. 
the severity of each experience from both 
an objective and subjective point of view’ 
(Pérez-Sales, 2017, p. 4).
Notwithstanding its breadth, a 
preliminary review of international 
jurisprudence reveals that international 
law does not provide a uniform approach 
to methods of psychological torture. It 
is beyond the scope of this review to 
further outline the definitional dynamics 
(interpretative variations, gaps, and 
limitations) with respect to psychological 
methods of torture in international law. 
What is clear is that, with the exception 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
(UNSRT), there is a tendency, where 
specific conclusions have been reached by 
certain bodies, to fix a high threshold for 
psychological torture violations. It suffices 
to say, however, that it remains unclear 
why some factual matrices are found to 
attract stronger criticism than others, and 
the inconsistency which reigns with respect 
to when exactly these bodies specifically 
condemn a psychological method as torture 
appears to thwart any meaningful analysis. 
Categorisation and typology
Another approach in striving for conceptual 
clarity, amidst such ambiguities, has been 
through categorisation (or an extensional 
definition), which involves providing a 
detailed list of techniques known to not 
leave physical marks. Rejali provides four 
categories with which to conceptualise such 
techniques including: i. positional torture, 
ii. exercising to exhaustion, iii. restraint 
torture, and iv. beatings (2007). Admittedly, 
these are also known to leave physical 
marks such as bruises and nerve damage. 
Ojeda, defining the phenomenon as ‘the 
intentional infliction of suffering without 
resorting to direct physical violence’, 
provides a relatively detailed starting point 
here in his 13 categories: 
isolation (including complete or semi-
solitary confinement); psychological 
debilitation (deprivation of basic 
needs, forced physical exertion); spatial 
disorientation (small, dark cells); 
temporal disorientation (denial 
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of natural light, erratic scheduling of 
activities); sensory disorientation 
(inducing perceptions of sensory 
failure, narcosis or hypnosis); sensory 
deprivation (hooding, blindfolding, 
darkness, sound proofing etc.); sensory 
assault (overstimulation) (bright 
lights, loud noise/music); induced 
desperation (arbitrary arrest, indefinite 
detention, random punishment, 
forced feeding, implanting sense 
of guilt or abandonment); threats 
(to self or others, mock executions, 
forced witnessing of torture); feral 
treatment (forced nakedness, denial 
of personal hygiene, overcrowding, 
forced interaction, bestialism, incest); 
sexual humiliation (forcing victim to 
witness or partake in sexual behaviour); 
desecration (forcing victims to 
witness or partake in violating religious 
practices (irreverances, blasphemy, 
profanity, defilement, sacrilege); 
pharmacological manipulation (non-
therapeutic use of drugs or placebos). 
(Ojeda, 2008, pp. 2-3)
A similar categorisation is found in 
Behan’s work:
disruption of daily rhythms and 
routines (night interrogation, disruption 
of sleep and biorhythms, early morning 
arrest, manipulating diet, sleep patterns, 
removal of all comfort items); isolation 
and sensory deprivation (solitary 
confinement, eliminating lights, sounds, 
odors, hooding); monopolisation 
of perception (constant bright cell, 
physical isolation, barren environment, 
restricted movement, monotonous 
food, sensory overload, interrogation 
in non-standard locations); induced 
debilitation; exhaustion (starvation, 
sleep deprivation, prolonged constraint, 
interrogation); threats (against self 
and/or family members of death, non-
repatriation, endless isolation and 
interrogation, vague threats); lies 
and deception (re evidence against 
detainee, use of falsified documents 
or reports); occasional indulgences; 
demonstrating omnipotence 
and omniscience; degradation 
(use of foul language, preliminary 
humiliation, confinement, denial of 
personal hygiene, filthy environment, 
denial of privacy, stripping, removal of 
clothing); enforcing trivial demands 
(forced writing, enforcement of 
extremely detailed rules); heightened 
suggestibility, hypnosis and 
narcosis; self-induced physical 
pain (forced sitting on edge of chair 
of stool, forced upright kneeling and 
standing, stress positions); physical 
abuse (waterboarding, manhandling, 
mild physical contact such as grabbing, 
poking, pushing); exploitation of 
phobias (individual or religious phobias, 
such as dogs); sexual humiliation 
(forced stripping etc.) (Behan as quoted 
in Ojeda, 2008, p. 120)
Unless explicitly emphasised that they are 
non-exhaustive, the patent danger with 
such categorisation, inter alia, is it becoming 
restrictive. As Pictet observed in his 
commentary to the Geneva Conventions as 
early as 1958:
However great the care taken in 
drawing up a list of all the various 
forms of infliction, it would never 
be possible to catch up with the 
imagination of future torturers who 
wished to satisfy their bestial instincts; 
and the more specific and complete a 
list tries to be, the more restrictive it 
becomes. (Pictet, 1958, p. 204)
The Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) 
adopts the same position in saying that it is 
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not ‘necessary to draw up a list of prohibited 
acts or to establish sharp distinctions 
between the different kinds of punishment 
or treatment; the distinctions depend on the 
nature, purpose and severity of the treatment 
applied’ (Human Rights Committee, 1992, 
§4). This rings especially true if we are to 
accept the assertion, by one account, that 
military technology is a decade or two more 
advanced than that of clinical or academic 
research (Pérez-Sales, 2017, p. 331).
A narrow definition embracing 
categorisation, or enumeration, of 
prohibited acts of psychological torture 
has been adopted by the United States of 
America. In domestically implementing 
the UNCAT, the definition adopted by the 
United States’ federal government presents 
an interesting case study. It refers to 
psychological torture as the:
...mental pain or suffering refers to 
prolonged mental harm caused by 
or resulting from: (1) the intentional 
infliction or threatened infliction of 
severe physical pain or suffering; (2) 
the administration or application, 
or threatened administration or 
application, of mind altering substances 
or other procedures calculated to 
disrupt profoundly the senses or the 
personality; (3) the threat of imminent 
death; or (4) the threat that another 
person will imminently be subject to 
death, severe physical pain or suffering, 
or the administration or application 
of mind altering substances or other 
procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses or personality.  
(18 U.S.C. §2340(2)(B))
There have been two main criticisms made 
against this definition: that enumerating the 
actions unduly (to threats of imminent death 
for instance) narrows the understanding of 
psychological torture, and that it requires 
prolonged mental harm, a requirement not 
found in the UNCAT. The latter point was 
explicitly made by the Committee against 
Torture (Conclusions and Recommendations: 
USA, 2006; hereinafter ‘CAT’).
Conceptions and their contestations: The legal 
versus the non-legal
The ruling of whether a particular act or 
omission constitutes torture is ultimately 
a judicial one. It is, however, inevitably 
informed by medical understandings 
due to the anatomical and psychological 
conceptualisations of pain. The dominance 
of blindly legal conceptualisations of torture 
has been contested for being devoid of 
this necessary non-legal perspective, for 
its opaque focus on severity, bias towards 
the physical, and its Euro-centrism. A 
number of experts, namely Pérez-Sales, 
Sveaass and Başoğlu, have argued for a 
better-informed definition which can help 
instigate a more scientific understanding of 
particularly psychological torture. Başoğlu, 
to reproduce one argument, explains that 
‘a legal understanding of torture provides 
protection from torture to the extent 
that it comes closer to its psychological 
formulation’ (2017, p. 492) and that 
what is needed is a ‘broader definition of 
torture based on scientific formulations 
of traumatic stress and empirical evidence 
rather than on vague distinctions … that 
are open to endless and inconclusive debate 
and, most important, potential abuse’ 
(2017, p. 397). 
Sveaass understands psychological 
torture to be ‘the process by which 
psychological pain is transformed into 
humiliation and dehumanisation, where the 
essence of being human—namely personal 
agency, values, emotions, hope, relationships, 
and trust—is under attack’ (2008, p. 304; 
see also Sveaass, 1994, p. 43). Pérez-Sales 
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also attempts to posit a workable definition 
as being ‘the use of techniques of cognitive, 
emotional or sensory attacks that target the 
conscious mind and cause psychological 
suffering, damage and/or identity breakdown 
in most subjects subjected to them; such 
techniques may be used alone or together 
with other techniques to produce a 
cumulative effect’ (2017, p. 8).
The disconnect between the legal 
and non-legal conceptualisations coupled 
with the dominance of the former clearly 
presents a problem for the advancement 
of our understanding of torture generally, 
and perhaps an even greater hindrance 
with respect to psychological torture. 
The minor role given to dignity and 
humiliation (linked to self and identity) 
which feature more prominently in non-
legal understandings is problematic when 
compared to ‘pain-producing techniques’ in 
legal understandings (Pérez-Sales, 2017, p. 
262). As shall be discussed later, severity has 
also proven a challenge for legal minds.
Practices and perpetuation of 
psychological methods
This section will explore how psychological 
methods are designed, enabled and 
perpetuated under the guise of science 
and lawfulness. The conceptual argument 
persists as we draw on ‘lawful sanctions’, 
‘intentionality’ and the difficulties with 
respect to distinguishing between torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment (CIDT). 
Scientific complicity: The ‘benevolence’ of 
technology
The scientific milieu out of which these 
methods have sprung is also of import to 
understanding the phenomenon. Technology, 
be it in the use of techniques, knowledge 
or personnel, has been used by state actors 
to act as an illusion of control purportedly 
safeguarding the process from breaching the 
pain threshold. 
This was recognised as early as 1978 
in the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 
where in his dissenting opinion, Judge 
Evrigenis, calling the majority out on their 
reasoning, found that torture in the case was:
... based on methods of inflicting 
suffering which have already been 
overtaken by the ingenuity of modern 
techniques of oppression. Torture no 
longer presupposes violence, a notion to 
which the judgment refers expressly and 
generically. Torture can be practised—
and indeed is practised—developed in 
multidisciplinary laboratories which 
claim to be scientific. (ECHR, 1978)
Rejali points out that at best this is also 
sourced from the perceived humanism 
and polyvalent use of technology. Pointing 
to the general public value in electricity-
based technologies as an example, Rejali 
argues that any ill-conceived use, say as 
constituting a torture method, is faced 
with a ‘civic doubt’ as to whether such 
a technology can be as harmful given its 
benefits to humanity (2003). 
Relatedly, revelations on the use of 
music as torture (its coerced listening 
(loud or otherwise), playing, singing or 
dancing) by the United States in places 
such as Guantánamo Bay promptly 
spawned a debate amongst academics and 
musicians alike. Music’s use as therapy 
renders it difficult to think of its use as 
torture. Spielmann, a past president of 
the European Court of Human Rights, 
has observed that certain uses of music 
‘can amount to torture, and lyrics can 
be the vehicle of human rights abuses’ 
(2012, p. 371). Such statements have 
been seen to herald a change in perceiving 
non-physical methods (Papaeti, 2013). 
21

























Grant’s assessment is that there is nothing 
intrinsically harmful about music so 
context is paramount. She prescribes:
Preventing the worst abuses of physical 
and mental integrity that can be inflicted 
through music begins with the much 
more simple act of removing the sheen 
from musical activities as in some way 
intrinsically beneficial and morally good. 
We need to face up to both the possible 
negative health effects of different 
musical practices and the long-standing 
conjunction between music and processes 
of humiliation and shaming (Grant, 
2013, p. 11). 
Perceived control: The perversion of ‘trust’ 
and ‘regulation’
The complicity of psychology and, perhaps 
to a lesser extent, psychiatry, intentionally 
or not, in lending their expertise to state 
intelligence apparatuses, from the beginnings 
of the Cold War to the ‘War on Terror’, is 
widely accepted in the literature (Physicians 
for Human Rights, 2005; Pope & Gutheil, 
2009; Soldz, 2011). It is important to 
recognise the psychology underpinning the 
psychological techniques of torture and 
warfare, which has been well-documented 
elsewhere (Lavik, 1994; McCoy, 2012; 
Suedfeld, 1990). 
Soldz has, for instance, illustrated 
in some detail the role of psychologists 
at Guantánamo Bay, in designing the 
environment to disrupt cohesion and 
communication among detainees and 
to foster dependence and compliance 
instead, and also controlling the 
minutiae of interrogations to the point 
of prescribing the limited provision of 
toilet paper to one detainee (2010). Yet, 
to the American public, the role of mental 
health professionals were represented here 
as ensuring that the pain threshold was 
contained to a level below that of torture 
(American Psychological Association, 
2005, p. 2). Trust in science was co-opted 
in order to appease public and institutional 
consciences. The wheeling out of the 
phrase ‘safe, effective, legal, and ethical’ by 
the Bush Administration was symbolic in 
manipulating the perception of torture:
… into an expert activity with “scientific 
techniques” and other accoutrements of 
professionalism provided advantages to 
the torturers, conscious and unconscious. 
The pseudo-scientific façade Jessen 
and Mitchell developed for the military 
created a fig-leaf of cover that the torture 
was not the primitive and sadistic 
behaviour it really was. It also gave senior 
military personnel a chance to escape 
accountability by turning torture over 
to “the docs”.” The Justice Department 
in effect created a “safe harbour” for 
interrogators. If a psychologist was 
involved in the interrogation, by the mere 
fact of the psychologist’s involvement, 
the “enhanced interrogation” was per se 
“safe, effective, legal, and ethical”. There 
was no requirement that the psychologist 
even do anything of a protective nature. 
His or her very presence, by executive 
definition, meant that the enhanced 
interrogation was “safe, effective, legal, 
and ethical”. (Welch, 2010, p. 6)
For Kalbeitzer, the coerciveness of 
interrogations, as designed by psychologists, 
was as simple as ‘designing the room in 
such a way as to create an intimidating 
atmosphere’ (Kalbeitzer, 2009). Such 
tailoring took into account the individual 
vulnerabilities of the subject. Başoğlu 
also provides a comprehensive account of 
the centrality of ‘learned helplessness’ in 
CIA’s design of its torture regime (Reyes & 
Başoğlu, 2017).
For what it is worth, the US Senate 
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confirmed that the CIA conducted no 
‘significant research to identify effective 
interrogation practices, such as conferring 
with experienced US military or law 
enforcement interrogators, or with the 
intelligence, military, or law enforcements 
services of other countries with experience 
in counterterrorism and the interrogation 
of terrorist suspects’ (US Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2014, p. 20)..
Observing this, O’Mara has deployed 
the term ‘cargo cult science’ to refer to such 
‘use of the language and even behaviours 
that bear some resemblance to science but 
critically without the scientific method and 
the intellectual commitments that follow 
from the adoption of the scientific method’ 
(2015, p. 30). Similarly, McCoy has also 
explored the nexus between science and 
impunity, and the means by which science 
sanitises and assists in emboldening and 
legitimating psychological methods of 
torture, where he states:
The language of science can make 
psychological torture seem like a series 
of carefully controlled procedures, 
sanctioned by rational experts who have 
the aura of authority that comes with 
knowledge and credentials (McCoy, 
2012, p. 24).
As a side note, McCoy’s work on the 
CIA’s development and propagation of 
psychological methods of torture extensively 
explores the relationship between impunity, 
history and public forgetting. The fragility 
of collective memory means that publicised 
cases of psychological torture are also 
susceptible to contestation and manipulation 
by media and the state, which, according 
to McCoy, ‘tear at the threads of collective 
memory, making each exposé seem isolated, 
anecdotal, and ultimately insignificant’ 
(McCoy, 2012a, p. 38). He goes on to 
underscore the power of history in diffusing 
efforts at prosecution and prevention.
As a belated point of qualification, one 
must bear in mind that as much as Rejali 
alludes to the unacknowledged malleability 
of technology towards different ends, one 
must also refrain from holding science 
to be ‘purely truth-seeking’ and devoid 
of values. Moreover, Evans and Morgan 
militate against torture as conventionally 
‘unrestrainedly savage’, instead depicting it 
as having long been cruel yet controlled, a 
‘carefully-regulated practice’ (1998, p. 58). 
Humiliation: Torture or inhuman and 
degrading treatment?
Back-tracking to powerlessness, fear and 
uncertainty, the relational dynamics, or the 
power imbalance, between the perpetrator 
and the victim, particularly with the use 
of psychological methods must also be 
considered. Whilst it is not exclusive to 
psychological torture, it may be argued 
that its significance is distinct when 
compared to the use of physical methods. 
For Pérez-Sales, torture arises where, upon 
this background of ‘powerlessness and 
suppression’, there occurs a violation of 
dignity and autonomy (2017, pp. 84-85, 
261). When the phenomenology of torture 
is surveyed further, we can see that the 
torturer demonstrates his power to exhaust, 
disorient, create dependency, create fear 
and humiliate his victim (Hauff, 1994, 
p. 21). Such a violation may also involve 
self-betrayal, where a victim for instance is 
forced in the circumstances to do something 
to acknowledge their absolute helplessness 
and submission. Doerr-Zegers, speaking 
from experience on treating Chilean torture 
victims, states that the ‘psychological 
component of torture becomes a kind 
of total theatre, a constructed unreality 
of lies and inversion, in a plot that ends 
inexorably with the victim’s self-betrayal and 
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destruction’ (McCoy, 2006, p. 10).
The notion of humiliation readily 
springs to mind here, which is 
conventionally associated with cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, and 
more specifically with degrading treatment 
(Ireland v. United Kingdom, §167). Yet, as 
shall be discussed below, psychologically-
informed systems of torture, such as those 
operated by the CIA, feature humiliation 
as a part of an overall method as a 
means of breaking the will and extracting 
information. It is upon this background 
that Nowak as UNSRT unearthed the 
centrality of ‘powerlessness’ to torture:
as the most serious violation of the 
human right to personal integrity and 
dignity, presupposes a situation of 
powerlessness of the victim which usually 
means deprivation of personal liberty or 
a similar situation of direct factual power 
and control by one person over another. 
… A thorough analysis of the travaux 
préparatoires of Art 1 and 16 CAT as well 
as a systematic interpretation of both 
provisions in light of the practice of the 
Committee against Torture has led me to 
the conclusion that the decisive criteria 
for distinguishing torture from CIDT is 
not, as argued by the European Court of 
Human Rights and many scholars, the 
intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted, 
but the purpose of the conduct and the 
powerlessness of the victim. (Nowak & 
McArthur, 2006, p. 150; 2008, p. 76; see 
also Nowak 2006, p. 832; Sifris, 2013)
This is also central for Manderson who sees 
the ‘experience of absolute powerlessness 
that reduces the victim, in their own eyes as 
well as their torturer’s, to an animal, a body 
without will or dignity of any kind … the 
destruction of identity’ (Manderson, 2005, 
p. 640). Applying this conceptualisation 
in his assessment of the detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, it was pointed out that:
Treatment aimed at humiliating victims 
may amount to degrading treatment 
or punishment, even without intensive 
pain or suffering. It is difficult to assess 
in abstracto whether this is the case 
with regard to acts such as the removal 
of clothes. However, stripping detainees 
naked, particularly in the presence 
of women and taking into account 
cultural sensitivities, can in individual 
cases cause extreme psychological 
pressure and can amount to degrading 
treatment, or even torture. The same 
holds true for the use of dogs, especially 
if it is clear that an individual phobia 
exists. (UN Commission on Human 
Rights, 2006, §51). 
Başoğlu, Livanou & Crnobaric, in their oft-
cited study, conclude that stress indicators of 
psychological methods including humiliation 
are similarly severe when compared to 
physical methods. They posit this as follows:
Ill treatment during captivity, such as 
psychological manipulations, humiliating 
treatment, and forced stress positions, 
does not seem to be substantially 
different from physical torture in terms 
of the severity of mental suffering they 
cause, the underlying mechanism of 
traumatic stress, and their long-term 
psychological outcome. Thus, these 
procedures do amount to torture, thereby 
lending support to their prohibition by 
international law. (Başoğlu, Livanou & 
Crnobaric, 2007)
This brings into question the feasibility 
of equating humiliation with the lesser 
category of inhuman and degrading 
treatment as most adjudicatory bodies 
continue to do. It must be said that, 
whether assumed or dismissed, explicit 
mention of ‘powerlessness’ in the work 
of relevant human rights bodies and 
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international law is negligible. Given its 
centrality, techniques of humiliation that 
seek to achieve a sense of powerlessness in 
the victim and the victim’s family, and are 
all too often found to amount to be less 
severe than torture, need to be seriously 
reconsidered, given the material differences 
between the consequences that flow from 
it, and any underestimation of pain and 
suffering addressed. 
Whilst it is accepted that the particular 
stigma attached to torture must remain 
reserved for the most atrocious instances 
of ill-treatment, the use of powerlessness 
firms up an opening for ill-treatment to 
be treatment that is not simply physically 
brutal. Yet, the resort to severity in 
differentiating between torture and CIDT 
has also been increasingly critiqued and 
abandoned. In Keenan v United Kingdom 
(2001), the European Court stated that 
while ‘it is true that the severity of suffering, 
physical or mental, attributable to a 
particular measure has been a significant 
consideration in many of the cases decided 
by the Court under Article 3 of the ECHR, 
there are circumstances where proof of the 
actual effect on the person may not be a 
major factor’ (§113). Coupling this with the 
Selmouni ruling, for the European Court, 
‘the level of pain inflicted is increasingly 
a less determinate factor, as acts it once 
considered only “inhuman” could now rise 
to the level of torture, depending on the 
context and purpose for which physical force 
is employed’ (Evans, 2002, p. 373; Selmouni 
v. France, 1999). 
A brief note on purpose under the 
UNCAT definition is warranted. It is widely 
interpreted to be inclusive of ‘such purposes 
as’ obtaining information or a confession, 
punishment, intimidation and coercion or 
discrimination and that it is, therefore, not 
exhaustive. Yet, there remains a dearth of 
analysis here when compared to the depth 
of discussion on other constitutive elements 
also found therein such as severity of pain 
and suffering and official capacity. During the 
drafting process, it seems that the United 
Kingdom’s proposal to include ‘gratuitous 
torture’, conceivably meaning torture 
without purpose or for self-gratification, was 
not adopted (Nowak & McArthur, 2008, p. 
75). As pointed out by Burgers and Danelius, 
purposes explicitly stated in the definition 
are based on state interest (1988, pp. 118-
119). This may mean that acts intended to 
humiliate or debase, those arguably closer to 
gratuitous, do not fall within the category of 
state interest, and therefore do not amount 
to torture. That said, even where private 
sadism predominates, there is ‘usually an 
element of punishment or intimidation’ 
sufficient to satisfy the purposive element 
under Article 1 (Burgers & Danelius, 1988, 
p. 119). Conversely, Article 2 of the Inter-
American Convention against Torture, 
whilst listing similar purposes, includes ‘for 
any other purpose’, hence not proscribing 
purposes to ones based on state interest.
‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ (EITs) and 
the ‘Five Methods’
Despite experience disproving the efficacy 
of coercive tools in eliciting reliable 
information, the context of interrogation 
poses a fertile ground for the infliction of 
torture (Costanzo & Gerrity, 2009). This 
is front and centre of UNCAT Article 1’s 
purposive element. Yet, much in the vein of 
psychological methods of torture, abusive 
interrogations have not been adequately and 
explicitly proscribed by international law. 
In remedying this, by calling for a protocol 
for non-coercive interviewing, the UNSRT 
(Mendez) recently stated that:
Torture and ill-treatment harm those 
areas of the brain associated with 
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memory, mood and general cognitive 
function. Depending on their severity, 
chronicity and type, associated stressors 
typically impair encoding, consolidation 
and retrieval of memories, especially 
where practices such as repeated 
suffocation, extended sleep deprivation 
and caloric restriction are used in 
combination. Such practices weaken, 
disorient and confuse subjects, distort 
their sense of time and render them prone 
to fabricate memories, even if they are 
otherwise willing to answer questions. 
They are also detrimental to the 
establishment of trust and rapport, and 
compromise the interviewer’s ability to 
understand a person’s values, motivations 
and knowledge — elements required for a 
successful interview. (UNSRT, 2016, §18)
Accusatorial, protracted or suggestive 
interviews overlayed with threats, 
manipulation and coercion are underscored 
as unethical, and depending on their 
‘degree, severity, chronicity and type, undue 
psychological pressure and manipulative 
practices’ may be ill-treatment (UNSRT, 
2016, §44). At the very least, one must 
accept the view of the CAT that ‘moderate 
physical pressure’, even when viewed as a 
‘lawful’ mode of interrogation by a state 
(i.e. Israel), is ‘completely unacceptable’ as 
it creates conditions leading to the risk of 
torture or CIDT (CAT, 1994, p. 10).
Undoubtedly, the gravest contemporary 
regime of psychological torture, to be 
publicised at least, has been the United 
States’ abuses of prisoners, by the later 
disavowed use of ‘enhanced interrogation 
techniques’, in various ‘black-sites’ around 
the world and notoriously in Abu Ghraib 
and Guantánamo Bay. In their seminal 
report ‘Break Them Down’, Physicians 
for Human Rights (PHR) lists the 
employed techniques as including: ‘sensory 
deprivation, isolation, sleep deprivation, 
forced nudity, the use of military working 
dogs to instil fear, cultural and sexual 
humiliation, mock executions, and the threat 
of violence or death toward detainees or 
their loved ones’ (PHR, 2006, p. 1). 
Herman underscores that such 
‘techniques of establishing control over 
another person are based upon systematic, 
repetitive infliction of psychological trauma’ 
(Herman, 2015, p. 69). Moreover, it is in the 
context of ‘highly controlled detention and 
interrogation environment used to exploit 
helplessness and vulnerability’ engendering 
the ‘denial of autonomy and dependency 
on interrogators’ that such techniques 
must be viewed (Physicians for Human 
Rights & Human Rights First, 2007, p. 6). 
Similarly, this system has been described 
as ‘ambiguous almost by design’ and the 
‘product of deliberate attempts to engineer 
tactics that provoke subtle forms of pain, 
relying on technological, psychological, and 
pharmacological innovations that maximize 
the pain or discomfort of the detainee’s 
experience while leaving minimal perceptible 
evidence of brutality’ (McDonnell, Nordgren 
& Loewenstein, 2011). 
Further on the point of ‘design’, it 
is axiomatic to say that trauma can be 
‘culture-bound’ and can differentiate 
across individuals as the ‘meaning of 
torture and trauma is shaped by social 
support and religious, cultural and political 
beliefs’ (Physicians for Human Rights & 
Human Rights First, 2007, p. 7). Another 
primary point of discussion has been the 
exploitation of cultural sensitivities of Arab 
men regarding sexual taboos (e.g. forced 
nakedness, contact with a woman) and 
other phobias (e.g. relating to dogs), based 
on a text called The Arab Mind by Patai 
from 2002. 
Surveying the mentioned regimes of 
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psychological torture, Reyes concludes that 
‘accumulation of methods’ together with 
‘unpredictability and uncontrollability’ 
(an aggravating feature similar to 
‘powerlessness’) are distinct features here 
(Reyes, 2007, p. 591). In the same vein, 
Başoğlu posits that the ‘most deleterious 
consequences stem from uncontrollable 
aversive events that are also unpredictable’ 
(Başoğlu & Mineka, 1992, p. 199). 
The cumulative or combined nature of 
these techniques warrants some expansion. 
Contextually, some legitimate interrogatory 
methods which may seem ‘minor’ or 
‘innocuous’ at first glance ‘become coercive 
if used over prolonged lengths of time’ 
(Reyes, 2007, p. 599). That is not to say 
that this is exclusive to or necessary for 
psychological torture. Also, isolated instances 
of methods such as mock executions, death 
threats or forcefully witnessing torture 
have been found to amount to torture. The 
thesis here rather is that such seemingly 
legitimate or innocuous means ‘form a 
system deliberately designed to wear and 
break down, and ultimately also to disrupt 
the senses and personality’ (Reyes, 2007, 
p. 599). In its latest report to the United 
States, the CAT explicitly recommended 
that uses of sensory deprivation and sleep 
deprivation at Guantánamo Bay were 
violations of the UNCAT and should be 
abolished (CAT, 2014, §17). The UNSRT 
has similarly assessed that ‘jurisprudence of 
both international and regional human rights 
mechanisms is unanimous in stating that such 
methods violate the prohibition of torture and 
ill-treatment’ (UNSRT, 2004, §17). 
Furthermore, the UNSRT has also 
seen it necessary to explicitly point out that 
‘the simultaneous use of these techniques 
is even more likely to amount to torture’ 
(UN Commission on Human Rights, 2006, 
§52). During his examination of ‘enhanced 
interrogation techniques’ as UNSRT, 
Rodley pointed out that ‘[e]ach of these 
measures on its own may not provoke 
severe pain or suffering’ but may do so in 
combination ‘applied on a protracted basis 
of, say, several hours’ (UNSRT, 1997, §121). 
Therefore, he considered a certain degree of 
combining methods or their accumulation 
and duration as requisite before the severity 
threshold became relevant. Sleep deprivation 
may also prove an apt case to illustrate 
the cumulative, as opposed to inherent, 
dynamics here. In its criticism of Israel, the 
CAT did not categorically state that sleep 
deprivation, in all cases, amounted to torture 
but detailed certain durations over specific 
periods that did (CAT, 1998, §24). 
Two European Court of Human Rights 
cases of Al Nashiri v. Poland (2014) and 
Husayn (Zubaydah) v. Poland (2014) where 
‘EITs’ were found as having been used 
in CIA black-sites in Poland make for 
enlightening reading here. In Al Nashiri, the 
victim was subjected to two mock executions 
(one with a power drill), stress positions 
and ‘EITs’. The Court characterised these 
techniques as ‘deliberate inhuman treatment 
causing very serious and cruel suffering’ 
amounting to torture under Article 3. In 
its assessment, the Court stated all the 
measures were applied in a:
premeditated and organised manner, 
on the basis of a formalised, clinical 
procedure, setting out a “wide range 
of legally sanctioned techniques” 
and specifically designed to elicit 
information or confessions or to 
obtain intelligence from captured 
terrorist suspects. Those—explicitly 
declared—aims were, most notably, “to 
psychologically ‘dislocate’ the detainee, 
maximize his feeling of vulnerability and 
helplessness, and reduce or eliminate his 
will to resist ... efforts to obtain critical 
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intelligence”; “to persuade High-Value 
Detainees to provide threat information 
and terrorist intelligence in a timely 
manner”; “to create a state of learned 
helplessness and dependence”; and their 
underlying concept was “using both 
physical and psychological pressures 
in a comprehensive, systematic and 
cumulative manner to influence [a 
High-Value Detainee’s] behaviour, 
to overcome a detainee’s resistance 
posture”. (§§ 515-516)
Husayn (Zubaydah) v. Poland involved 
another CIA detainee who had been 
subjected to the ‘EITs’, and at ‘least 83 
waterboard sessions in a single month’, 
before being implicitly threatened with such 
a method again if he failed to comply. In its 
assessment, the Court observed:
that this permanent state of anxiety 
caused by a complete uncertainty about 
his fate in the hands of the CIA and 
a total dependence of his survival on 
the provision of information during 
the “debriefing” interviews must have 
significantly exacerbated his already 
very intense suffering arising from the 
application of the “standard” methods 
of treatment and detention in the 
exceptionally harsh conditions. (§ 509) 
A clear antecedent to this system was the 
‘five techniques’ as used by the British 
Military firstly in Northern Ireland, during 
the Troubles, on individuals suspected to 
be involved with the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA). It consisted of:
(a) wall-standing: forcing the 
detainees to remain for periods of some 
hours in a “stress position”, described 
by those who underwent it as being 
“spreadeagled against the wall, with 
their fingers put high above the head 
against the wall, the legs spread apart 
and the feet back, causing them to 
stand on their toes with the weight 
of the body mainly on the fingers”; 
(b) hooding: putting a black or navy 
coloured bag over the detainees’ heads 
and, at least initially, keeping it there all 
the time except during interrogation; 
(c) subjection to noise: pending their 
interrogations, holding the detainees in 
a room where there was a continuous 
loud and hissing noise; (d) deprivation 
of sleep: pending their interrogations, 
depriving the detainees of sleep; (e) 
deprivation of food and drink: 
subjecting the detainees to a reduced 
diet during their stay at the centre and 
pending interrogations. (§96)
When considering these methods, the 
(now defunct) European Commission of 
Human Rights, focusing on the combined 
psychological impacts, found that the five 
techniques constituted torture on the grounds 
of the intensity directly affects the personality:
physically and mentally [and that] 
the systematic application of the 
techniques for the purpose of inducing 
a person to give information shows a 
clear resemblance to those methods 
of systematic torture which have been 
known over the ages... a modern 
system of torture falling into the same 
category as those systems... applied 
in previous times as a means of 
obtaining information and confessions. 
(ECommHR, 1976: Ireland v. United 
Kingdom, § 512)
When it progressed to the European Court 
of Human Rights however, it disagreed 
and held that the ill-treatment only 
amounted to cruel inhuman and degrading 
treatment but not to torture because the 
necessary severity and intensity of harm 
that a finding of torture required was not 
established (according to the de minimis 
rule). In his dissenting opinion, holding that 
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the treatment constituted torture, Judge 
Matscher stated that: 
the more sophisticated and refined the 
method, the less acute will be the pain 
(in the first place physical pain) which it 
has to cause to achieve its purpose. The 
modern methods of torture which in their 
outward aspects differ markedly from 
the primitive, brutal methods employed 
in former times are well known. In this 
sense torture is in no way a higher degree 
of inhuman treatment. On the contrary, 
one can envisage forms of brutality which 
cause much more acute bodily suffering 
but are not necessarily on that account 
comprised within the notion of torture.
By some accounts, this was a lost 
opportunity to stamp out the contemporary 
uses of such techniques, and has been 
linked to the reluctance of the Court to find 
a violation of torture from 1978 to 1996 
(Rouillard, 2005, p. 30). Recently reviewing 
the case upon disclosure of new evidence, 
the Court decided not to change its original 
conclusion (Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 
5310/71, 20 March 2018) primarily upon 
the principle of legal certainty. Despite this, 
in view of its subsequent statements as noted 
above and in Selmouni v. France (1999, see 
§101), the Court would now clearly find 
a regime similar to the five techniques as 
amounting to torture.
Two decades later, a combination of 
interrogation methods comparable to the 
five techniques, for instance, as has been 
used by Israel on Palestinian prisoners, were 
documented by the CAT in 1997 to include: 
(1) restraining in very painful conditions, 
(2) hooding under special conditions, (3) 
sounding of loud music for prolonged 
periods, (4) sleep deprivation for 
prolonged periods, (5) threats, including 
death threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7) 
using cold air to chill …
It assessed this regime as amounting 
to violations of Articles 1 and 16 of the 
UNCAT (CAT, 1997, § 257). Similarly, the 
HRC assessed the Israeli use of ‘the methods 
of handcuffing, hooding, shaking and sleep 
deprivation to have been and continuing as 
being used as interrogation techniques, either 
alone or in combination’ and that it violated 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (HRC, 1998, §19).
Assessment and documentation of 
psychological methods
The preceding discussion has attempted to 
sketch out a number of inter-related elements 
which obscure a thorough consideration 
of psychological torture. Compounding 
these, perhaps more intentional, biases are 
shortcomings in assessing and documenting 
allegations of psychological ill-treatment. 
When compared with the visibility of physical 
signs of ill-treatment, the relative invisibility 
of psychological impact can frustrate the 
processes of evidence-seeking fora.
The ‘Break Them Down’ report observes 
the health consequences of psychological 
methods to be ‘extremely destructive’ in the 
short and long term, including:
… memory impairment, reduced 
capacity to concentrate, somatic 
complaints such as headache and 
back pain, hyperarousal, avoidance, 
irritability, severe depression with 
vegetative symptoms, nightmares, 
feelings of shame and humiliation, 
and posttraumatic stress disorder … 
incoherent speech, disorientation, 
hallucination, irritability, anger, 
delusions, and sometimes paranoia … 
depression, thoughts of suicide and 
nightmares, memory loss, emotional 
problems, and are quick to anger 
and have difficulties maintaining 
relationships and employment. Based 
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on past experience, post traumatic stress 
disorder is likely to be common. (PHR, 
2005, p. 9)
The main issue with respect to the 
evidentiary dimension is formulating 
approaches to best understand and 
document such effects. Most conventional 
understandings of torture involve the 
application of physical force; documentation 
has, therefore, entailed primarily analysing 
the ensuing physical marks and indicators. 
Thus, it is imperative to find processes, 
legal and medical, on which evidentiary 
corroboration can be formed, specifically 
sensitive to psychological torture. 
Admittedly, specific means of 
documenting psychological torture remain 
limited. Psychiatric and psychological 
sequelae are strong indicators of 
psychological torture as it is of physical 
torture. Yet, it is notable that psychological 
methods are used in combination, either 
simultaneously or sequentially, to reach 
a desired effect, as illustrated in the ‘five 
techniques’ and ‘EITs’ (see ICRC, 2007, 
p. 9). It has been argued that this makes it 
‘nearly impossible to determine the specific 
cause of psychopathology shown’ (PHR, 
2005, p. 70). 
Psychological methods of torture and the 
Istanbul Protocol
Importantly, the Istanbul Protocol accepts 
that, since torturers increasingly seek to 
conceal their crimes, ‘the absence of such 
physical evidence should not be construed 
to suggest that torture did not occur, 
since such acts of violence against persons 
frequently leave no marks or permanent 
scars.’ (OHCHR, §161; see also §§ 159, 
259, 260). Yet, the unrealistic expectations 
placed on medical experts who treat and 
document torture (Freedom from Torture, 
2015) coupled with the persisting materialist 
bias (that is, a preference for the physical) 
of decision-makers render this declaration, 
despite increasing awareness, less than fully 
realised in practice.
Ultimately, however, the Istanbul Protocol 
conflates the physical and psychological 
methods and rejects a clear dichotomy 
as ‘artificial’ (OHCHR, 2004, §145). For 
Reyes, this is understood by the fact that, 
from a holistic, evidence-based perspective, 
both physical and psychological torture and 
effects need to be anticipated. Yet, for him, 
this somewhat undercuts the stand-alone 
importance of psychological torture and 
obfuscates the understanding of the stand-
alone impact of psychological methods (2007, 
pp. 600-603). Also, for Pérez-Sales, the 
Istanbul Protocol needs to refine its conception 
here, and that just because ‘the distinction 
is artificial (i.e. made for epistemological 
purposes), it does not mean that we shouldn’t 
keep in mind that the ultimate target of 
torture is the conscious self, and that we 
should reflect on contemporary torture and 
the complex ways in which this conscious self 
is attacked and controlled’ (2017, p. 308). 
The logic between the act and the 
effect (without overemphasising the effect) 
is problematic. It is difficult to frame the 
question with sufficient specificity; concepts 
like ‘causality’, ‘link’, and ‘relation’ though 
useful can prove to be problematic as direct 
causality rarely exists in medicine. Medical 
professionals work with percentages and 
likelihoods in merely identifying where 
there is corroboration and working with a 
patient’s statement. It is important to refrain 
from overemphasising the role of individual 
resilience. Therefore, requiring effect will 
disadvantage resilient victims. While existence 
of psychiatric sequelae remains a ‘powerful 
indicator’ of psychological torture insofar 
as ‘depression, anxiety and posttraumatic 
symptoms’ can corroborate the treatment 
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alleged (Pérez-Sales, 2017, p. 144), such 
sequelae, however, can never be said to be 
diagnostic of ‘any particular source in the 
way that a particular scar is diagnostic of a 
burn or electrical shock’ (Jacobs, 2008, p. 
169). Moreover, in rejecting legal notions of 
causality in favour of relativity, Pérez-Sales 
points out that it is a fallacy to expect science 
to establish ‘an unequivocal causal relationship 
between certain practices and their 
consequences in order to determine the limits 
of torture’ (Pérez-Sales, 2017, pp. 274-275).
Difficulties arising out of the invisibility 
of impact lead the discussion to exploring 
the purposive alternatives as well as 
environmental assessments. For Pérez-
Sales, evaluating torture environments 
can be a significant means to document 
psychological torture. He defines the 
torture environment as: 
… a milieu that creates the conditions 
for torture … made up of a group of 
contextual elements, conditions and 
practices that obliterate the will and 
control of the victim, compromising 
the self. … In epidemiological terms, 
any element can be considered part of 
a torturing environment if it has been 
identified as likely to increase the relative 
risk of severe physical or psychological 
suffering, if it is used within the context 
of torture or if it is employed with the 
purpose of inflicting torture. … Given 
that methods aren’t used alone but as 
part of a system, the environment they 
operate in also needs to be holistically 
assessed. (2017, pp. 285, 330) 
In a study conducted by Pérez-Sales et al, 
Basque prisoners held in incommunicado 
detention were interviewed at length in 
order to ‘elaborate a prototypical process of 
detention and ill-treatment which helped to 
understand the dynamics of an interrogation 
procedure’ (Pérez-Sales, 2016, p. 21). There, 
the authors underscore that this methodology 
builds on conventional descriptive and 
testimonial documentation to encompass a 
broader epidemiological approach: 
The creation of a Torturing Environment 
requires the interaction of several 
elements: (a) sensorial and temporal 
disorientation and confusion of the 
self- reflecting mind; (b) fear and terror 
that starts from the outset of detention 
and remains present throughout; (c) 
humiliations and attacks on identity 
that contribute to eroding any sense of 
control; and, (d) tension and beatings 
that produce physical and emotional 
exhaustion. The capacity of the victim 
for proper understanding, retrieval of 
memories, judgement and reasoning 
is progressively undermined. The 
techniques of emotional manipulation 
and cognitive distortion used during the 
interrogation complete the process. 
Soon strengthened by validation (see Pérez-
Sales, Martínez-Alés, Gonzalez Rubio, 
p. 2018), the Scale represents a leading 
tool of documentation with respect to 
psychological methods. 
This is identified by its author as 
complementing and compatible with the 
Istanbul Protocol, primarily to bring to the 
fore, and hence better appreciate, methods 
of psychological torture. Whilst this is 
a promising and innovative proposal, it 
remains to be tested and used more widely. 
Similarly, explorative studies into the 
neurobiology of psychological torture also 
promise to provide corroborative evidence 
through identifying biological markers 
(Ojeda, 2008).
Subjectivity and severity: Obfuscation of pain, 
bias, resilience
Whilst also tied to physical instances of ill-
treatment, the elements of subjectivity and 
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severity feature distinctively with respect 
to psychological torture. Subjectivity is 
used here to refer to both specific factors 
pertaining to individuals claiming to have 
been subjected to torture as well as the 
unfounded bias of decision-makers assessing 
‘severe pain’ to require the physical and 
downplaying the psychological. 
In her seminal work, Scarry explains 
that the ‘unshareability’ of pain underscores 
the significance of considering subjectivity 
in assessing torture claims (Scarry, 1986). 
Some commentators have argued that this 
‘unshareability’ is constant, for it is seen 
to be based on human impulses to be 
self-serving in our assessments (in using 
ends-based reasoning) and having a hot-
cold empathy (not being able to register 
pain through witnessing or hearing about 
it) (Nordgren, McDonnell & Loewenstein, 
2011). Tied to this, the concept of 
severity has been critiqued by prominent 
commentators as being ‘vague and open to 
interpretation’, ‘not susceptible to precise 
gradation’ and ‘virtually impossible’ based on 
these reasons. 
Conversely, it must be pointed out 
that medical professionals diagnose and 
administer relief when treating varying 
levels of pain, physical and psychological, 
on a daily basis. It is instructive to note 
that the difficulties present with respect to 
subjectivity have also been used as an excuse 
to conclude ‘pain is a subjective experience 
and there is no way to objectively quantify it’ 
(Stover, Koenig & Fletcher, 2017, p. 392). 
Accordingly, theoretical problematising, as 
outlined below, must be approached with 
some degree of caution.
The methods at hand challenge ‘reliance 
on a solely objective analysis of suffering, due 
to the difficulties in measuring intangible 
psychological injuries’ (Yarwood, 2008, p. 
336). Partially arising out of this, conventional 
understandings of severity also reveal a 
materialist or physical bias, ‘that the physical 
is more real than the mental’ (Luban & Shue, 
2011, p. 823). Reyes compares the relative 
ease of documenting the physical with the 
psychological in the following passage: 
Physical forms of pain and suffering 
are more readily understood than 
psychological forms, although physical 
suffering may also be hard to quantify and 
measure objectively—defining severe pain 
and suffering involves an assessment of 
gravity that is difficult to make, as these 
notions are highly subjective and may 
depend on a variety of factors, such as the 
age, gender, health, education, cultural 
background or religious conviction of the 
victim. (Reyes, 2007, p. 593)
Attempts, by notorious figures in the 
Bush Administration, to obscure the 
conceptualisation of torture have entailed 
the unfounded claims such as ‘mental 
suffering is often transitory, causing no 
lasting harm,’ (US Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 1990, p. 17) or that 
torture is ‘broken bones, electric shocks to 
genitalia … pulling your teeth out with pliers 
… cutting off a limb … Is waterboarding 
at the same level? I’d say probably not.’ 
Similarly, it has been suggested that 
psychological methods such as solitary 
confinement or sleep deprivation are more 
readily dismissed as we all experience 
and tolerate small doses of solitude and 
sleeplessness in our daily lives, without ever 
understanding the impact of the extremities 
(McDonnell, Nordgren & Loewenstein, 
2011). Commenting on this mentality, 
O’Mara assesses this as being: 
the all-too-common mistake of consulting 
the contents of his consciousness to define 
torture—not statute law, not international 
treaties, not medical authorities, not the 
scholarly literature. This leaves us with a 
32




























problem: when we think of torture, our 
thinking is deeply colored by images of 
medieval cruelty: the rending of flesh, 
the breaking of bones, and pain made 
visible through scar and scream. We do 
not think of techniques that leave no 
visible record of their presence, techniques 
that manipulate the metabolic and 
psychopathological extremes of body, 
brain, and behaviour, and which are, 
by any reasonable standard, torture. 
(O’Mara, 2015, p. 11; see also Posner, 
2004, pp. 291-292)
This brings into focus the discomfort 
versus ill-treatment debate. Pérez-Sales 
admits that it is ‘difficult to know why some 
techniques [such as the use of music] and 
not others would qualify as “uncomfortable”; 
the distinction between “torture” and 
“discomfort” seems to be merely semantic’ 
(2017, p. 328). Interrogations, after all, 
regularly exploit specific vulnerabilities of an 
individual in making them uncomfortable. 
What is more, recognising that a vast 
proportion of torture victims prove resilient 
(as high as 60% by one measure (Pérez-
Sales, 2017, p. 144), distinguishing the 
impact of psychological torture as opposed 
to discomfort is made additionally difficult 
(Başoğlu, 2009, p. 142). 
Compounding this, psychological torture 
is defined as anything but torture by those 
partaking in its infliction or legitimisation: 
the torturer defines it as a technologically-
controlled method designed to fall short 
of severe harm (Sveaass, 2008, p. 304); 
politicians have narrowly defined it in times 
of national security issues as ‘enhanced 
interrogation’ (McDonnell, Nordgren & 
Loewenstein, 2011, p. 94; see also Luban 
& Shue, 2011, pp. 826-827); and, some 
domestic courts have avoided attributing 
torture to state authorities, if possible (see 
PCATI v. Israel, 1999). 
Biased preconceptions against defining 
psychological methods as torture are 
infamously illustrated by the European 
Court of Human Rights’ decision in Ireland 
v United Kingdom as the five techniques 
were found not to ‘occasion suffering 
of the particular intensity and cruelty 
implied by the word torture’. This equated 
torture with ‘acts of extreme barbarity’ 
and not the ‘systematically researched and 
applied subtle techniques of psychological 
manipulation which nullify the human will’ 
(Spjut, 1979, p. 271).
This has been remedied, fully cognisant 
of subtle mechanisms of torture, in the 
definition of the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture which reads: 
Torture shall also be understood to 
be the use of methods upon a person 
intended to obliterate the personality of 
the victim or to diminish his physical or 
mental capacities, even if they do not 
cause physical pain or mental anguish. 
(OAS, 1985, Article 2)
Here: i. pain is not required; ii. severity of 
suffering is not required as the emphasis is 
on methods not consequences; iii. purpose 
is to ‘obliterate the personality of the 
victim’ or to ‘diminish his mental capacities’ 
(Pérez-Sales, 2017, p. 3). As the measure 
of severity is side-stepped, a purposive 
measure of psychological torture, one more 
conducive to capture the phenomenon, 
can be applied. This also brings into play a 
number of elements Pérez-Sales deems to 
be especially significant to the psychological 
torture context, including: i. the relationship 
pattern between torturer and tortured; 
ii. circumstances of the torturing system 
(political persecution, law enforcement 
procedure, etc.); iii. whether techniques 
target identity; and, iv. the severity of each 
experience from both an objective and 
subjective point of view.
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Taking into account the conceivably 
infinite iterations of psychological methods 
as designed to target an individual’s 
particular values, it can be argued that the 
complexity of subjectivity surpasses that 
of physical pain. Interpersonal elements, 
such as the increased susceptibility to 
psychological harm for those with a 
supportive familial environment (‘securely 
attached’) on the background of their trust 
in humanity and benevolent worldview 
(Kanninen, Punamäki, Qouta, 2003), and 
the use of an individual’s severe phobia of 
the dark during coercive interrogations have 
been but two aspects documented in the 
literature (Lewis, 2005).
A comparable complexity is confirmed 
in medical literature on trauma, as 
there ‘are infinite ways of reacting and 
psychologically processing the same event’ 
(Pérez-Sales, 2017, pp. 129-133). Pérez-
Sales points out that DSM’s definition 
of trauma has been refined from ‘an 
extensional definition (“extraordinary 
events”), to a subjective consequentialist 
definition (“overwhelming emotions”), 
and now to an objective consequentialist 
definition (“threat”)’ (2017, pp. 133-134). 
To mirror this development, torture would 
exclude the objective severity test, avoid 
an extensional definition, and consider 
‘exposure to threat as the core feature’.
How does, for instance, a male 
decision-maker fully appreciate the impact 
of sexual humiliation of a woman? (Arcel, 
2003) How does one articulate witnessing 
the regular desecration of the Koran or 
being prevented from praying? (Khan, 
2010; McCoy, 2012) How can a decision-
maker gauge the anguish of a third party 
such as a relative or witness who vicariously 
experiences the impact of torture? The 
questions abound but not for a lack of 
interest in the answers. 
Conclusions: Room for reflection 
and research
In light of the difficulties outlined in this 
paper, international and national bodies 
need to better incorporate a medical 
understanding, particularly a psychological 
one, that is workable within the severity 
paradigm. Questions arising from some of 
the key literature in this review include: How 
can the law better reflect the phenomenon 
of psychological torture through the prism 
of psychology, in terms of quantifying 
severity, duration and effects? How do we 
then achieve a confluence between the two 
fields with respect to this issue? To quantify 
level of pain, medical professionals resort 
to notions of ‘duration’, ‘frequency’, and 
‘intensity’. Other notions such as ‘dignity’, 
‘agency’, and ‘fear’ perhaps need to be 
factored in more strongly. 
At the very least, these must be 
understood and engaged with by the law. 
Related understandings also need to be 
accepted. The three decades of research, 
some of which is outlined here, does not 
support the equation that the magnitude of 
applied stress will result in a corresponding 
magnitude of impact. That is, little stress 
could lead to a significant impact, and 
great stress to little impact. There are many 
variables (e.g. age, culture, health) to render 
general rules unsuitable such as a minimum 
six hours of sleep for every 24, or that 
certain symptoms are exclusively linked to 
certain acts.
Given the shortcomings in the law, there 
exists enough space to develop and sharpen 
standards, both regionally and internationally. 
Identifying institutional, cultural and practical 
shortcomings of professionals, namely police, 
lawyers, judges, psychologists and doctors 
etc., and their related institutions in this area 
will be important in developing the necessary 
tools of training and documentation. 
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Relatedly, it has been pointed out 
that what is required is to fix a common 
understanding of psychological torture 
which is defined based on strong research, 
which international and national bodies, 
recognising its value, would adopt and 
operationalise in their work. Specifically, 
they need to clarify and expand on the 
notion of ‘mental suffering’ as part of the 
definition of torture. To that end, two broad 
sets of issues can be identified as those that 
impede this understanding, as follows: 
i. How do victims’ prior psychological 
states (broader than the notion 
of ‘condition’ to include personal 
values and other subjective qualities) 
influence assessments of psychological 
torture’s impact? Can we, and if so 
how do we, differentiate the trauma an 
individual is subjected to, due to their 
mere interaction with criminal justice 
apparatus and processes, from anything 
that amounts to ill-treatment of any 
severity (torture or not)? Taking victims 
as one finds them is a basic principle of 
civil and criminal law. At the very least, it 
is not a mitigatory factor in international 
law. Accordingly, factoring in a victim’s 
‘predisposition to suffer’, or conversely 
‘resilience’, raises complicated issues. 
ii. How do we overcome the existing 
hierarchies (where some physical torture 
methods enjoy quicker recognition than, 
for example, humiliation)? Is a western 
psychological understanding of trauma, 
particularly with respect to psychological 
torture, applicable and transferrable 
to non-western jurisdictions? If not, 
what are the issues arising for the 
recognition of psychological torture in 
those jurisdictions? What are the factors, 
such as common misconceptions, 
professionals demonstrate in contributing 
to and/or dealing with the prevalence of 
psychological torture? What is the level of 
awareness that psychologically coercive 
acts can amount to torture? How many 
domestic criminal codes fail to recognise 
the mental element? What training 
tools can be developed to complement 
or re-work the existing deficiencies in 
knowledge and process?
Outstanding questions necessitating further 
reflection and research, arising out of 
this review, point to improved dialogue 
between of psychology and law, developing 
and sharpening standards with respect to 
documentation and, in turn, prevention, 
prosecution and adjudication.
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